Abstract-In a P2P system, a client peer may select one or more server peers to download a specific file. In a P2P resource economy, the server peers charge the client For the downloading. A server peer's price would naturally 'depend on the specific object being downloaded, the duration of the download, and the rate at which the download is to occur. The optimal peer selection problem is to select, from the set of peers that have the desired object, the subset of peers and download rates that minimizes cost. In this paper we examine a number of natural peer selection problems for both P2P downloading and P2P streaming+ For downloading, we ohtain the optimal solution for minimizing the download deIay subject to a budget constraint, as well as the corresponding Nash equilibrium. For the streaming problem, we ohtain a solution that minimizes cost subject to continuous playback while allowing for one or more server peers to fail during the streaming process. The methodologies developed in this paper are applicable to a variety of PZP resource economy problems.
INTRODUCTION
Today many computers participate in peer-to-peer file sharing applications in whch widely distributed nodes contribute storage and bandwidth resources [I] , [21, 131, [4]. It is wideIy documented, however, that these P2P systems are havens for "free riders": a significant fraction of users do not contribute any significant resources, and a minute fraction of users contribute the majority of the resources [l] , [5], [6] . Thus, to improve the performance of existing P2P file sharing systems, and to enable new classes of P2P applications, a compelling incentive system needs to be put in place to encourage users to make their resources available. Now suppose the existence of an online marketplace where entities -such as peers, companies, users etc. -buy and sell surplus resources. In this market place, a peer might purchase storage and bandwidth from a dozen other peers for the purpose of remotely backing up its files; a content publisher might purchase storage and bandwidth from thousands of peers to create a peerdriven content distribution network; a biotechnology company might purchase CPU cycles from thousands of peers for distributed computation. If such a flourishing resource market existed, individual peers would be incited to contribute their resources to the marketplace, thereby unleashing the untapped resource pool.
We envision a free-marker resource economy in which peers buy and sell resources directly from each other [7] , [SI. In this market, selling peers are free to set the prices of their resources as they please. A client peer, interested in purchasing a specific resource, is permitted to "shop" the different server peers and choose the peers that best satisfy its needs at the best prices. The "money" paid by the client peers and earned by the server peers may be real money, or some pseudo-currency similar to frequent flyer miles. When a seller earns money, it can later spend the money in the resource market, obtaining resources from other seller peers.
In a P2P resource economy a client peer can select one or more server peers for downloading a file or streaming a stored audiohide0 object. In general, multiple server peers may have the object available, with each offering a different price. A serving peer's price will naturally depend on the specific object, the duration of the transmission, and the rate at which the transmission is to occur. The client may obtain different portions of the object in parallel from different serving peers, as is currently already the case w i~ KaZaA and other file sharing systems. The optimal peer selection problem is to select, from the subset of the peers that have the desired object, a set of peers and downloading rates that minimize cost and/or delay.
More specifically, when a client peer wants to obtain a specific object, the following steps may be taken:
(1) Discovery: The client first uses a look-up service to discover server peers that have a copy of the object. K a Z d is one example of such a lookup service. but structured DHTs could also be used for this. (2) Pricing: The client then queries the server peers for their prices. Alternatively, price information might be available via the lookup service.
(3) Reputation: The client may also use a reputation service to determine the reliability of each of the server peers. (Reputation services are beyond the scope of this paper; see [9] , [lo] .) (4) Server and rate selection: From the subset of reputable server peers offering the object, the client peer selects the server peers from which it obtains the object. The client obtains different segments of the object from each of the selected server peers.
The servers may offer a segment at different upload rates, and advertise an upload price as a function of the upload rate. The client peer will naturally want to choose the server peers (and rates) to minimize cost and delay. (5) Payment: Money is transferred from the client peer to the server peers. A protocol for transferring money in a P2P resource market is described in 171,
In this paper we study the optimal peer selection problem for two delivery schemes: ( i ) streaming, where the portions of the object must arrive in a timely manner such that the client peer can render the object without glitches; (ii) downloading, where the client wants to receive the entire file as quickly and inexpensively as possible, but does not render the file during the download. For both schemes, there are many variations of the optimal peer selection problem. For example, for downloading. one can minimize the download delay subject to a cost constraint, or minimize the cost subject to a download delay constraint. We do not attempt to solve all possible variations in an encyclopedic manner. Instead. we have formulated a few problems that we feel are particularly representative and important. The techniques developed in this paper can be extended to other natural variations.
For the downloading problem, we formulate and solve the problem of minimizing the (parallel) downloading time subject to a budget constraint, We find that the optimal solution is a greedy one in which costly servers are fully excluded from downloading. We also determine the Nash equilibrium for the servers' prices. For the streaming problem, we consider the problem of minimizing cost subject to a continuous-playback constraint. Because server peers often fail {because of intentional or unintentional disconnects from the P2P system), we also consider peer failures in our formulation. We are able to find the optimal solution when any subset of f chosen peers may fail. We solve the streaming problem for both convex and concave cost functions.
For both schemes, a content publisher may also be an active component of the system. For example, CNN.com
181.
may contract with a large number of peers to store chunks of video files. When another peer, say Alice, asks CNN to see a video, CNN may select the peers on Alice's behalf. The selected peers wouId then either stream or upload the object. depending on the deIivery scheme. The methodology developed in this paper is applicable when the client peer is to select the server peers, or when an intermediate peer (such as CNN) selects the server peers on the client's behalf.
The contribution of our work is the development of theoretical methodologies for these types of peer selection problems. To facilitate the analysis, we use a model of the network where delivery rates can more or less be guaranteed. As d~scussed in the next section. this assumption can be partially justified due to the abundance of bandwidth in the Internet core. Implementation of peer selection techniques in more accurate networking models, whle not explicitly addressed in this paper, can more easily be accomplished by using our results as a guide or starting point.
rI. PRICING MODEL
In this section we describe our pricing model. As mentioned in the introduction, each server is free to set its own prices, Consider a server peer i. As part of a delivery session, peer .i will transfer a portion of the bytes of some object U to a client peer. For such a delivery, the server peer will fix an appropriate price that could naturally depend on:
The object itself: For example, recently-released objects (e.g.. videos) might be more expensive than older objects. 4 Rate of transfer: The server may be able to transfer the object at different rates, and charge different prices for different rates. In thrs paper we suppose that peer i has a maximum transfer rate u i and can transfer at any rate b in the interval [0, U!,] .
Duration of transfer:
The longer the transfer (at some constant rate), the more a server should charge. We typically expect the server's pnce to be proportional to the duration of the transfer. Before proceeding, let us examine more carefully what it means for a server to be able to transfer bytes at a specific rate b. A server i will have access to the Internet with some upstream rate U+. At any given time, the server peer i could be transferring files to multiple peers, with each file transfer taking place at its negotiated rate. In order to meet its commitment, server i. of course, must ensure that the sum of all the committed transfer rates does not exceed its upstream access rate ui. In today's Internet (and in the foreseeable future), the bottleneck is typically in the access and not in the Internet core. Furthermore, in most broadband residential connections today (including cable modem and ADSL), the upstream rate is significantly less than the downstream rate. Thus, in many cases the bandwidth bottleneck between server and client is the server's upload rate. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a server can provide an offered rate b as long as the sum of server's committed ongoing m e s is less than ui. Even when this assumption is unreasonable, the formulations and results of this paper provide a framework and starting point for studying scenarios without the assumption.
There will be situations, however, when the server will not be able to honor its commitment due to unusual congestion or service failures in the core. In this case, the client peer may want some form of a refund. Furthermore, either the server or the client may be dishonest and may not agree on whether the service was actually rendered. Thus, some form of arbitration -preferably lightweight -may be needed in a realistic P2P resource market; see, e.g., [7] . In Section IV, we will describe a client strategy that allows one or more of the contracted peers to fail, either because of technical problems or dishonesty.
OPTIMAL PEER SELECTION FOR DOWNLOADING
As discussed in the Introduction, in this paper we explore the optimal peer selection problem for two delivery schemes, streaming and downloading. In this section we consider the downIoading problem, in which case the client wants to receive the entire file as quickly and inexpensively as possible, but does not render the file while downloading.
Naturally, a client desiring a specific object o would like to obtain the object as quickly as possible and at lowest possible cost. These two objectives will often be conflicting, as servers that provide high transfer rates may also demand high per-byte transfer costs. There are many ways to formulate an optimization problem that takes into account these conflicting goals. In this section, we consider one natural formulation: the client selects the peers and rates in order to minimize the total download time subject to a budget constraint for the download. (Although not considered here, the problem of minimizing the cost subject to a constraint on the download time is also tractable.)
We can now define the optimal downloading problem. Consider a client peer that wants to download a file o. Let F be the size (in bytes) of the file. As described in the introduction, the client peer uses a location service to find the set of peers, denoted in the following as selection problem is to determine bi, i = 1, .. . , J . and ti, i = 1 , . . . , I , that minimize the total download time subject to the budget constraint. Because the client is downloading from multiple server peers in parallel, the total download time is the maximum of the ti. Thus, the optimization problem is min max(t1,. . . , t r ]
Note that since the the cost functions ~ ( b ) are nondecreasing, any optimal solution must make the constraint in (3) binding. (For otherwise, we can decrease bi and/or ti for some i, while maintaining feasibility and not increasing the objective value.) Also note that without the budget constraint (2), the optimal solution is given by bi = ui, ti = F / ( u l +. 
A. Coricave Pricing Functions
As discussed in Section 11, depending on the broader context, a cost function may be either convex or concave. We first consider the scenario when ci(b), b G [O: ui] is concave, for all i = 1! . . . > I . As it will become evident below, this scenario also provides the solution for the case when each server is capable of transmitting at only the rate u i at cost ci = ci(u.i)/ui per byte. This way. %ti = bjtj, hence, the constraint in (3) remains intact, while the constraint in (2) continues to hold since . r
Cj(b>)t$ 5 C j ( b j ) t j ,
which is equivalent to
i.e., the non-increasing property of cl (b) / b mentioned above. Furthermore, since t$ 5 t j , the objective value will not increase. 0
The above lemma implies that the optimal decision on the rates. hi's, follows directly from the optimal ti's, and hence can be eliminated from the problem formulation. SpecificaIly, letting c, : 
Therefore, it suffices to solve the LP problem. To this end, re-order the server peers such that 0 < c1 < . . . < C I . It is easy to verify that p j /~j is increasing in j , since and the last inequality follows from (10). We note that Below. we start deriving a dual feasible solution, which then leads to a primal feasible solution via complementary slackness. Once these are verified -dual and primal feasibility and complementary slackness -the problem is completely solved.
Letting the constraints in (13) and (14) be binding, we get:
Then, the dual objective becomes The dual feasible solution results in a dual objective
For the corresponding primal solution, consider the following:
where T J is the primal objective value, obtained via substituting the above solution into (7) and making the latter an equality:
from whic.h we can obtain i.e., the prima! objective value is equal to the dual objective value in (17).
We still need to verify primal feasibility and comple- are positive, and all primal constraints except n :~ 5 '~ary, the I-th consuaint in (9), are binding. Next suppose K I F falls into the following range:
Then, the dual solution is: 
B. Comex Pricing Fclizctiorzs
We now consider the downloading problem for convex pricing functions. Specifically, in this section we suppose that ~( b ) is convex with respect to b for all i = 1,. . . , I .
We'll see that this scenario gives rise to a completely different form for the optimal solution. In particular, for many natural pricing functions, all I servers will be selected with none of servers transmitting at its maximal rate. Let t* denote the minimal download time for the downloading problem. 
The optimal t* is found by finding the smallest t such that the objective value for (23)-(25) is no greater than K . The optimization problem is a marginal analysis problem; it can be efficiently solved with the techniques in Section IV. Moreover, since the cost functions are convex, the value of the optimization problem (23)- (25) is convex in t (see Section IV). Thus, the optimal t can be found with a binary search. We remark in passing that another interesting aspect to consider is a restriction on the From the discussions in the last two subsections, in particular the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, it is clear that the required concavity or convexity of the cost functions ci(b) can be relaxed to the weaker condition of c ( b ) / b being non-increasing or non-decreasing, respectively. Note that a function f ( . ) with x > 0 and
decreasing. This is a standard property in reliability theory, refer to [12] . It is well-known (and easy to verify) that a convex function is star-shaped, but a star-shaped function need not be either convex or concave. Rr(E) = (CI + 6)k:r = 0 < Rr(C), again establishing (26). D The Nash equilibrium in Corollary 1 has several notaMe properties:
1) The price 2; does not depend on U$, the upload rate of server i. 2) All peers have the same price in the Nash equilibrium.
3) For each peer, the Nash price is exactly equal to the price per byte that the client is willing to pay, namely, K j F .
. Thus, y = F/Br-1 and 51 = 0. Thus
Iv. OPTIMAL SELECTION FOR STREAMING
In thrs section, we consider streaming of encoded (compressed) audio or video. The delivery constraints are more stringent than for downloading: in order to prevent glitches in playback, the servers must continuously deliver segments of the object on or before their scheduled pl ayout times.
An important parameter for the streaming delivery is the object's playback rate, denoted by r . For an object of size F with playback rate T , the viewing time is T = F / r seconds. Suppose the user at the client begins to view the video at time 0. A fundamental constraint in the streaming problem is that for all times t with 0 5 t 5 T , the client must receive the first T . t bytes of the object. We refer to th~s constraint as the "continuousplayback" constraint. Thus, when selecting the server peers and the object portions to be obtained from each server peer, the client must ensure that this continuousplayback constraint is satisfied. A natural optimization problem is, therefore, to select the peers in order to minimize the total streaming cost subject to continuous playback. To simplify the analysis and to see the forest through the trees, throughout we assume that there is no initial client buffering before rendering. that is, the client begins playback as soon a s it begins to receive bytes from any server. Note that for streaming, it is highly desirable that the playback can continue even if some of the server peers fail to provide their services. (In contrast, for downloading a server failure will merely result in a delay in the total download time.) Thus, it is important to explicitly account for failure in the optimal peer selection problem.
As in the previous section, denote {11 . . . : I } for the set of server peers that have a copy of the desired object, and denote c,(b) for the cost per unit time when peer i transfers at rate b. To simplify the discussion, we remove the restriction bt 5 U,; thus, we allow bz to take any value
Note that in general, the client must not only select a subset of peer servers, but it must also determine and schedule the specific portions of the file that are downloaded from each selected peer, as well as the download rate from each selected peer. There are two broad approaches that can be taken to solve this problem: time segmentation and rate segmentation. In time segmentation, the video is partitioned along the time axis in distinct segments, and each server is responsible for streaming only one of the segments in the partition. Typically in the optimal solution for time segmentation, the client will begin downloading segments from various servers before the scheduled playout times of the first bytes of those segments. Thus, client buffering is required, Furthermore, in the optimal solution, the client will typically receive segments from a11 the selected servers at the beginning of the video and from only one of the selected servers at the end of the video. This means that the client must be able to download (at the beginning of the video) at a rate that is equal to the sum of the server download rates, which will exceed the playback rate. In the rate segmentation approach, each of the selected servers contributes bytes for each of the frames in the video, and at any instant of time the client downloads at the playback rate. In this paper we focus on rate segmentation.
To justify focusing on rate segmentation, we now demonstrate that for convex cost functions, time segmentation is at least as expensive as rate segmentation in terms of download cost. Since time segmentation has the additional drawbacks of requiring both client buffering and higher client download rates. rate segmentation for such cost functions will usually be the better strategy. 
A. Problem Formulation
In the rate-segmentation streaming problem, to ensure continuous playback the client must receive (at least) at rate r at all times. Thus the objective of the streaming problem is to choose the server rates 61, , . . , b~ which minimize the total cost cl(bl)T + . . + c~( b l ) T subject to the constraint that the total received rate is at least r .
Because the servers in a P2P system are inherently unreliable, we must ensure that the client continues to receive at rate T even when one or more of the selected servers fails. In the ensuing analysis, we allow for up to one server failure (in the next subsection we extend the analysis to multiple server failures). If server j fails during some period of the streaming, then the client receives at rate bi. Thus, to ensure that the client continues to receive the video at rate T even when there is one failure, the rates b l , . . . , bI must satisfy X b i 2 T , j = 1, * , , > I .
We therefore arrive at the following optimization problem:
Without loss of generality we have included the constraints b, < T for all i = 1, ..., I. Indeed, if an optimal solution has bj > r' for some j , we can always reduce bj to T without violating feasibility and without having to increase the objective value [since c j ( . ) is a nondecreasing function).
Before proceeding to solve this streaming problem, we briefly say a few words about implementation. The optimal solution to (29) typically has br + . . . + bK > T , that is, the aggregate streaming rate {before failure) exceeds the encoded video rate r. In practice, the video would be erasure encoded in a manner that server i sends xi = biT bytes and that client can reconstruct the video if any T -1 of the 1 streams are received. Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is indeed possible to devise such erasure encoding schemes.
The above problem can be solved by first solving the following problem: for any given y: 0 5 y 5 T , .
Denote C(y) as the corresponding optimal vaIue. Then, solve the problem min,<,? C(y).
To show that the two problems are equivalent, let be the set of feasible solutions for (29) and, @(y) be the set of feasible solutions for (30). It is easily seen that if ( b l , . . . I b~) belongs to @(y) for some 0 5 y 5 T , then ( b 1 , . . _ , b i ) also belongs to a. Furthermore, it is seen that if (bl, . . . , b~) belongs to Q, then it also belongs to @(y), where y = maxi{bi} 5 r . Thus, Continue until the constraint C j bj 2 T + y is satisfied.
That is, C(y) is a convex function. To summarize, we have:
Theorem 4: Suppose for each i = l,.,,)I, c i ( . ) is a Note that the c o m~l e x i t~ of this ako'ml is proportional to 1(7'+Y)/Aa To (Ietemine the best Y, we can do convex function+ Then, the optimal value in (30), ~( y ) , is convex in 3. In this case, fie streaming problem in (29) a line search On ''(9) = 09 for 9 E [fi, ' 1. 
., I } ) .
We can start from where the previous round of marginal allocation -the one that generates C(y) -first hits a boundary. i.e., bj = y for some j , and continue from there. Or. if no bj has hit the houndary in the previous round, then simply start from where the previous round ends (Le,, continue with the solution generated by the previous round). [Recall, The convexity of C(y), in turn, is guaranteed if the &(-) are convex functions. To see this, let (l~i(y));~=, denote the optimal solution to the problem in (30), and consider two such problems, corresponding to y = y1 and y = y2, respectively. For any cy E (0; l), we have ky 2 T + y.1
Now, suppose the costs G(.), i. = 1, . . . , I , are concme (instead of convex) functions. The equivalence of (29) and (30) 
where (il:. . . , 2:1) is a permutation of (1: . . . , I ) . Denote cy; := Ci(3),
Clearly. we only need to consider no more than k such extreme points, which we shall refer to as nondornirzanr. Each of the other extreme points is dominant, in the sense that it's objective value C ( g ) will dominate (i.e., be at least as large as) one of the non-dominant points.
Let a-i denote the vector (CYI, a2, . . . , a k ) without the component ai for some i = 1, ..., k. Then, specifically. As before, let C(y) denote the optimal objective value of (30). Then the C(p) value corresponding to an extreme point is the sum of k -1 values of ai (for k -1 distinct 2's) and one value of @j for a j that is distinct from all the 2's. We may be able to further eliminate some of the non-dominant points. Let us illustrate this through an example. Consider 12 = 5. Suppose the permutation in (31) is ( 2 1 , . . . , i s ) = (2,4, I, 3, .5). Consider k = 4. Then, the following four points correspond to the ones in (33) (2,4, 1!3,5) in the above example.
The full details of this example can he worked out as follows: In each case, the optimal solution (to (30)) is obtained by comparing the C(y) values of the non-dominant points and picking the one corresponding to the smallest C(y) value.
Finally, a comment on the Iine search mentioned in the above proposition. Suppose we divide the interval [fi: T ] into equal segments, each of length A. Let N := r(J-2) denote the number of such segments. When A is sufficiently small, we can safely assume that the ordering in (31) does not change over any given segment. This means that for any p that belongs to a given segment, the optimal value C(y) is determined by a single nondominant point (a-iE; &). That is.
i<k,i#it
Hence, C(v) is a concave function over this segment, since the e; and cif are all concave functions. Consequently, the minimum of C(y) can only be attained at the two end points of the segment. Therefore, the line 
Let C(y) be defined as in (30). Then the minimal cost (29) is given by
We use the solution procedure described in Section IV-C to evaluate C ( g ) for y E [fi! T ] . This result is plotted in Figure I@) . As can be seen from Figure l 
is neither a concave nor a convex function, implying that a line search has to be done for finding Cqt. It can aIso be seen that C, , is acheved at 9 = 2.5.
The corresponding optimal bandwidth profile is given by b1 = 0, b2 : 2.5, b3 = 2.5, b4 = 2.5. The corresponding cost of downloading is C, , = C(2.5) = 3.4557.
D. Multiple UnavailabEe Servers
The above approach extends readily to the general case when multiple servers can become unavailable. Let f be the maximum number of servers that can be unavailable, The key observation here is that the optimal solution to (36) must satisfy the property that the largest f values of bi are all equal. Specifically, without loss of generality, suppose (38) is an optimal solution to (36)+ Then, we must have bl = b 2 = * . -= b j . Consider any e < f , and hence be 2 b f .
We can reduce be to bf and still do no worse on the objective value (as the ci's are non-decreasing functions), while maintaining feasibility. To see this, consider the bf + bf+2 + * . + br 2 T , (39) Reducing be to b j turns the above into (40) which certainly holds as it is one of the conssaints involving bf . Furthermore, any other constraint that involves be has a left hand side that is at least as large as the left hand side of (39) -due to the ordering in (38). Hence, it will also remain feasible when be is reduced to b f , since its left hand side, after the reduction, will still dominate the left hand side of (40).
Therefore, we can solve the following equivalent problem: 
. , I
This equivalence is similarly argued as before. First, any feasible solution to (36) is a feasible to (41) i.e., it satisfies the constraint in (36) as well. Hence, we can solve the equivalent problem in (41 j as in the case of f = 1, €or both convex and concave cost functions. It is easy to see that, for both types of cost functions, we must have y 2 6 ; otherwise, the problem is infeasible. For concave costs, we will consider the intervals y E [~; -&I , for k = f + 2 : . t : I (assuming f 5 I -2, the case of f = I -1 being trivial). For the k-th interval, the non-dominant points are k -1 dstinct bi values set at y, and another distinct bj set at r -(k -f -l)y, with the total being ( 6 -l ) y + T -(k -f -1)y = T + fg; and 0 5 7' -(k -,f -1)g I y (i.e., bi is feasible), or v. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION We envision a free-market resource economy in whch peers buy and sell resources directly from each other. In the context of a P2P resource market, we considered the problem of optimal peer and rate selection. To our knowledge. this is the first work that considers optimal peer selection in a P2P resource market.
Throughout this paper we allowed for a natural pricing function of the form ~( b i )
. ti. where i indexes the peer server, bi is the rate at which the server transmits bytes to the client, and t, is the duration of the transfer. We considered optimal peer selection for two broad classes of problems: downloading and for streaming. For both classes of problems we considered both convex and concave cost functions.
For the downloading problem with concave cost functions, we provided an explicit solution to the problem, whereby all selected peers transmit at their maximum rate ui. For convex cost functions we showed how the problem can be easily solved with marginal analysis, and that for many natura1 convex cost functions, all 1 servers are selected, with none of the servers transmitting at their maximal rates, We also found that in the Nash equilibrium, each server sets its cost to the price per byre that the client is willing to pay.
For the streaming problem, we showed that for problems of practical interest, rate segmentation can always do as well as time segmentation. We then focused on rate segmentation. We first considered the scenario in which at most one server peer can fail. We then extended the results to the scenario in which up to f server peers can fail, for any value of f , We again analyzed both convex and concave cases. We found that each case requires a different methodology, although both cases are quite tractable.
The contribution of our work is the deveIopInent of theordcal methodoiogies for these types of peer selection problems. We have formulated and solved a rich array of optimal downloading and streaming problems. The techniques presented here should be helpful in solving alternative formulations of peer selection problems.
